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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1823
PATTY L. SCHUMACHER
v.
SOUDERTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;
LOWELL A. TINNER, SUPERINTENDENT;
SOUDERTON AREA SCHOOL BOARD;
RICHARD SWARTLEY, PRESIDENT - UNTIL 12/2002;
RICHARD E. THOMPSON, VICE PRESIDENT UNTIL 12/2002;
STAN WISLER, SECRETARY; DONNA DEVLIN, TREASURER;
TRACY G. COLE; RICHARD G. DETWILER; SHARON J. GEHRET;
PETER O. KRANZ; ERIC R. MACDOUGALL; RALPH "BUD" MILLER
Patty Schumacher,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-04477
 District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 27, 2004
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ALARCÓN*, Circuit Judges
(Filed July 29, 2004)
     *The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit, sitting by designation.
2OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
In this employment discrimination case, appellant Patty L. Schumacher challenges
two orders of the District Court.  We will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
I
Schumacher worked for the Souderton Area School District (“School District”) as
a math teacher for 14 years and as a geography teacher for one year.  According to
Schumacher, she suffered discrimination and transfer of position after disclosing to the
School District that she had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder. 
In March 1999, she filed a complaint against the School District, asserting claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 950 et seq.  The complaint also asserted claims of age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983, retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §1201, and
breach of contract relating to a collective bargaining agreement between Schmacher’s
union and the School District.  
On November 9, 2000, at a hearing before Magistrate Judge Wells, the parties
successfully reached a settlement agreement.  Among other provisions, the settlement
3contained a stipulation of confidentiality and a release by the plaintiff of all claims against
the School District. 
On July 8, 2002, Schumacher filed a complaint alleging the School District failed
to properly inform the pension fund of her income as stipulated under the terms of the
settlement.  The School District filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it abided by all
the terms of the settlement agreement.  It also filed a motion to seal the pleadings and
references to the terms of the settlement agreement.  By order dated November 6, 2002,
the District Court granted the motion to seal the pleadings.  By order dated February 25,
2003, the District Court granted the School District’s motion to dismiss without prejudice,
allowing Schumacher to refile claims relating to post-settlement conduct with leave of
court on or before May 22, 2003.  Schumacher appealed, challenging these two orders.  
II.
A. Order dated November 6, 2002
Orders which limit access to the trial record are generally considered final and
appealable.  28 U.S.C. § 1291; United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1355-1356 (3d Cir.
1994), rev’d for other reasons, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).  But an appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the entry of the judgment.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); 28 U.S.C. §
2107(a); Berke v. Bloch, 242 F.3d 131, 135-136 (3d Cir. 2001).  In this case, the District
Court issued the order to seal the pleadings on November 6, 2002, but Schumacher did
not file an appeal until March 24, 2003.  Because she exceeded the 30-day filing
     1Even if we had appellate jurisdiction, Schumacher has not provided us an adequate
record to support her claim that her complaints were inappropriately dismissed.  Salazar
v. Atlantic Sun, 881 F.2d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 1989).  She has not provided a transcript of the
November 22, 2002 hearing at which the District Court dismissed her complaint, so the
District Court’s reasoning would be unavailable for review.  
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requirement, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over her appeal of the order dated November
6, 2002.  See Berke, 242 F.3d at 136 (“An untimely appeal does not vest an appellate
court with jurisdiction”); Marcangelo v. Boardwalk Regency, 47 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir.
1995) (“The time limits provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 are
‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ and the courts are required to dismiss untimely appeals
sua sponte.”).
B. Order dated February 25, 2003
Motions to dismiss without prejudice are generally not final and appealable so long
as the plaintiff is permitted to refile the complaint upon remedy of the deficiency.  Ahmed
v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2002); Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d
Cir. 2003).  In its order dated February 25, 2003, the District Court granted the School
District’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and with permission to refile all claims
with the leave of the court by May 22, 2003.  Accordingly, the order was not appealable,
as Schumacher could have refiled her complaint in the permitted time period and obtained
leave of court as required by the order.  Instead, Schumacher directly appealed the order
to this Court.  The District Court’s order was not final, and we do not have appellate
jurisdiction.1
5III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
 
